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ABSTRACT. In many countries, flood defense has historically formed the core of flood risk management but this strategy is now
evolving with the changing approach to risk management. This paper focuses on the neglected analysis of institutional changes within
the flood defense strategies formulated and implemented in six European countries (Belgium, England, France, the Netherlands, Poland,
and Sweden). The evolutions within the defense strategy over the last 30 years have been analyzed with the help of three mainstream
institutional theories: a policy dynamics-oriented framework, a structure-oriented institutional theory on path dependency, and a policy
actors-oriented analysis called the advocacy coalitions framework. We characterize the stability and evolution of the trends that affect
the defense strategy in the six countries through four dimensions of a policy arrangement approach: actors, rules, resources, and
discourses. We ask whether the strategy itself  is changing radically, i.e., toward a discontinuous situation, and whether the processes
of change are more incremental or radical. Our findings indicate that in the European countries studied, the position of defense strategy
is continuous, as the classical role of flood defense remains dominant. With changing approaches to risk, integrated risk management,
climate change, urban growth, participation in governance, and socioeconomic challenges, the flood defense strategy is increasingly
under pressure to change. However, these changes can be defined as part of an adaptation of the defense strategy rather than as a real
change in the nature of flood risk management.
Key Words: change in policy; defense strategy; flood management; institutional theory; path dependence
INTRODUCTION
It is a core expectation of European societies that they are able
to protect themselves from disasters. Consequently, where flood
risks pose serious threats, defense has been a central pillar of
resistance. By “flood defense,” we mean a specific strategy that
aims to decrease the likelihood and/or the magnitude of flooding
by keeping water away from people: infrastructural works that
aim to resist water, such as dikes, dams, barriers, embankments
and weirs, upstream retention, or the provision of more space for
the water outside of protected areas (Hegger et al. 2013). With
their embankments, dikes, or others fortifications, cities have been
symbols of protection (Mumford 1961). Among the different
flood risk management (FRM) strategies, e.g., prevention,
mitigation, or preparation, flood defense could perhaps be said
to best suit the conception of the “society of resistance.”  
However, the place of defense is changing. According to Beck
(1992, 2006), today no European society can be described as
completely resistant because it faces the risk of not being able to
cope with a disaster. We can argue that the concept of a zero risk
society has been superseded. According to Luhmann, societies
become modern when they stop considering risk as something
outside their control, i.e., fate and the past, which determines the
future; instead it becomes a probability that must be faced
(Luhmann 1993). Rather than merely building higher and higher
levels of protection, with increasingly improving safety standards,
modern societies must accept the possibility of defense failure.  
This acceptance of the possible failure of defense and, with it, the
idea of full protection, is accompanied by new policy concepts in
the field of FRM. In the contemporary social and political science
literature, we speak of vulnerability models (November 1994,
2004), especially in complex urban environments (d’Ercole et al.
1994, De Sherbinin et al. 2007, d’Ercole and Metzger 2009). The
concept of vulnerability aims to evaluate the possibility of the
disruption or interruption of the functioning and development
of a territory. In the 2000s, the resilience concept, especially the
part relating to the capacity to absorb, recover, and adapt,
advanced a new approach in FRM. Hence, the vulnerability
concept has been superseded by the resilience concept. Relating
to the notions of social-ecological and evolutionary resilience
(Folke 2006, Brand and Jax 2007, Folke et al. 2010, Hegger et al.
2014), the more holistic and overarching concept of resilience
introduces the need to cope with risk, adapting human behaviors,
and transforming urban societies, leading to the promotion of a
variety of strategies for FRM. There is growing recognition of
the need for change in the flood defense strategy stemming either
from institutional and political discourses, or from the evolving
social and economic needs of a resilient society. In this new
paradigm, the flood defense strategy is no longer the only solution
(European Union 2007).  
Despite this changing nature, the specific evolution of flood
defense as a strategy has received little analysis from either a social
science perspective nor from a comparative study perspective. The
majority of the literature on flood defense consists of articles
from fields such as civil engineering, geology, or physical
geography and is essentially concerned with managing the hazard,
the statistical analysis of the risk, or of the (non)robustness of
infrastructure, etc. (Hu et al. 2014, Cheetham et al. 2015, Van
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Table 1. Flood defense measures in the six selected countries.
 
Belgium England France Netherlands Poland Sweden
Dike elevations
Watercourse
maintenance
Water code
Defense planning
Barriers including tidal
surge barriers
Embankments
Flood walls
Sluices
Demountable defenses
Conveyance
engineering (e.g.,
dredging)
Compartment dikes
Quay walls
Retention basins
outside the area to be
protected
Watercourse
maintenance
Weirs and dams,
dikes
Compartment dikes
Dikes, dunes
Erosion prevention
measures
Nonprimary structures
Polders
Protection works
Quay walls
Retention basins
outside the area to be
protected
Watercourse
maintenance
Weirs
Widening, deepening,
dredging
Winter beds
Compartment dikes
Quay walls
Weirs
Winter beds
Watercourse
maintenance
Dams (mainly
nonpurpose)
Temporary measures
(sandbags, pumps)
Dredging, ditches and
embankments
Wetlands (mainly
nonpurpose)
From Alexander et al. 2015, Ek et al. 2015, Kaufmann et al. 2015, Larrue et al. 2015, Matczak et al. 2015, Mees et al. 2015.
Veelen et al. 2015). From a social science perspective, some
authors have highlighted the technocratic paradigm that has long
pervaded flood management institutions (Brown and Damery
2002) and have explored the evolution toward a more socio-
technical variety of FRM alongside more traditional, centrally
managed structural and technical measures (Nye et al. 2011).
Taking an empirical and a comparative perspective, we aim to
highlight institutional changes and pose the following questions.
Has the defense strategy been replaced by other strategies or
forced to adapt? To what extent are institutions in charge of flood
defense ready to change flood defense as a strategy? Does it mean
that the flood defense strategy has become less dominant among
the FRM strategies or that a new approach within the flood
defense strategy has appeared?  
To address this knowledge gap, we propose to examine specific
shifts in flood defense and the result of those changes through an
institutional framework. The study presents a comparative
analysis of the evolution of the defense strategy in six European
countries relying on legal and bureaucratic systems: Belgium,
England, France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden.
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS
The FRM strategies in the six countries were studied within the
comparative data collection of the three-year research project,
STAR-FLOOD, funded by the European Commission. To be able
to compare the changes that have occurred within the flood
defense strategy of the six countries, we organized our data
collection around the four dimensions of the policy arrangement
approach (PAA; Van Tatenhove et al. 2000, Wiering and Arts
2006, Wiering and Crabbé 2006). This allows us to evaluate if
change has occurred or not in four interwoven or interrelated
dimensions of a policy arrangement: actors and coalitions, rules,
resources, and discourses. The actor dimension refers to the actors
and their coalitions involved in the policy domain. The division
of resources between them can lead to differences in their ability
to influence policy outcomes. The rules dimension refers to the
formal and informal procedures for decision making and routine
interactions. The policy discourses entail views and narratives,
norms, values, and problem definitions.  
The six selected northern European countries (Belgium, England,
France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden) represent a variety
of flood types. Although we do not aim to evaluate hydrological
change exactly and specifically, we state that, facing a global
increase in frequency, magnitude, and spatial distribution of
floods, the six countries all are influenced by climatic and
socioeconomic change; however they do not react similarly. The
changes with regard to the flood defense strategy are also due to
others factors. We study specifically internal institutional factors.
The six selected countries also represent a variety of flood policies
implemented from the 1980s to the 2010s. Whereas they have long-
implemented defense strategies, and generally a common legal
tradition and bureaucratic authority, the six countries’ policies
are based on different types of measures and different
responsibilities for state, market, and civil society (see Table 1).  
The empirical data used in this paper are based on the country
and case study reports written in the STAR-FLOOD research
project. Within this project, the researchers of the consortium
have based their analysis on extensive interviews with
stakeholders (50 interviews per country on average), observations,
policy and legal document analysis, and workshops with
practitioners. Because of length restrictions, the paper cannot
elaborate on all the specificities of country and case study analyses
on which it is based. No graphical or statistical presentation of
results from interviews will be provided. However, we will make
ample use of concrete illustrations from our extensive research.
A more detailed presentation of the analysis can be found in the
six publicly available project reports (Alexander et al. 2015, Ek et
al. 2015, Kaufmann et al. 2015, Larrue et al. 2015, Matczak et al.
2015, Mees et al. 2015).  
Based on the fieldwork of social scientists and legal scholars, the
authors reflected together on how the defense strategy is
implemented in their own country. The time period taken into
account in the analysis for each country is approximately the last
30-35 years, depending upon the specific flood policy milestones.
Taking into account these periods allows observation of patterns
of change, and also stability, in the defense strategies within the
countries through an empirical, inductive, and comparative
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research approach structured on the four PAA dimensions (actors,
rules, resources, and discourses).
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: HOW TO EXPLAIN
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE?
Studying change in the defense strategy is particularly interesting
because it is often earmarked as the oldest, strongest, most
institutionalized, and mostly dominant strategy for FRM in
Europe and somewhat resistant to change. Until now, there has
been no theoretical social science paper to systematically evaluate
the degree of institutional changes in flood risk governance across
a range of countries, by looking at the core dimensions of
institutions (actors-coalitions, rules of the game, division of
resources, and discourses).  
The body of literature on which we draw our conceptual
framework is institutional change theories. Such theories aim to
clarify (lack of) societal evolution with arguments on the
importance and complexity of institutions. For the purpose of
this paper, we have selected one particular theory on institutional
change, completed with two others, considering that they form a
mainstream strand of literature. First, the long-term policy
dynamics-oriented framework on institutional change by Streeck
and Thelen (2005) will provide a general framework for explaining
institutional change and stability. Further, we add to this
framework a more structure-oriented institutional theory on
institutional path dependency (North 1994, Levi 1997, Pierson
2000, Greener 2002) and a more policy actors-oriented analysis
called the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (Sabatier and Weible
2007). Because the Policy Arrangement Approach combines
attention for both actor and structure-related theories of change
and offers a practical analytical framework for describing policy
arrangements, we use the PAA to both assess and explain the
changes or stability that have occurred in flood defense strategy
in each country. In that context, we will refer to the four
interrelated dimensions of policy arrangements, presented above:
actors, rules, resources, and discourses (Van Tatenhove et al.
2000).  
Streeck and Thelen (2005) developed a model aimed at analyzing
institutional change through a typology of the results and
processes of that change. This model enables assessment of the
process of change (either incremental or abrupt) and the result of
change, presented as continuity or discontinuity. For these
authors, substantial change is defined as either temporary turmoil
or as a relatively complete, radical, abrupt, and rapid change. The
authors assume that abrupt changes often stem from exogenous
factors, for instance, a catastrophic flood event, but can also come
from endogenous factors, e.g., type of government, new legal law,
etc. Nonsubstantial changes are minor, incremental, or adaptive.
The two variables are important in light of the research goal: the
process of change (abrupt or gradual) and the result of change,
because they explicitly stress how the nature of changes can lead
to different results. Related to the results of such changes, they
are defined as either further development of a traditional pattern
(continuous) or an (abrupt or steady) transformation of the policy
domain (discontinuous). According to Streeck and Thelen’s
framework, amendments, additions, or revisions to existing sets
of institutions characterize continuity in change, whereas
discontinuity occurs when institutions either face breakdown,
replacement, or more invisibly but substantially transform
(“creeping change”). Highly visible, brutal change often leads to
discontinuity, however, the authors teach us to be aware of other
paces and other combinations of change trajectories. Table 2
presents all of the options.
Table 2. The process and result of change typology.
 
Result of change
Continuity Discontinuity
Process of
change
Incremental Reproduction by
adaptation
Gradual
transformation
Abrupt Survival and
return
Breakdown and
replacement
From Streeck and Thelen (2005).
Following the framework of Streeck and Thelen (2005), we first
analyze the dynamics of change, i.e., incremental or abrupt,
within the flood defense strategy in each of the six countries under
study in the last 30-35 years to assess the result of change, i.e.,
continuity or discontinuity. This analysis is developed for each of
the four PAA dimensions presented above. The framework of
Streeck and Thelen is stimulating, concrete, and simple enough
to address the comparison on flood management strategy.
Therefore, it is well suited for in-depth empirical case studies.
Moreover, it allows us to test all the options such as “radical
change can lead to a continuous situation,” but also “minor
change to discontinuity.”  
The second theory that composes the Streeck and Thelen
framework is the path dependency approach (North 1990, Pierson
1993, 2000). This refers to policies in which the “preceding steps
in a particular direction induce further movement in the same
direction” (Pierson 2000:252). This is especially important with
regard to flood risk defense because this strategy is dependent on
long-term investments in flood infrastructure (dams, dikes,
embankments) and their technical and institutional management,
including the security of technical expertise embedded in
organizations and protected by rules of the game. This leads to
high fixed costs and long-term increasing returns, which fosters
stability. The path dependency model helps us explain more
precisely how and why past decisions encourage policy continuity.
Also, Streeck and Thelen (2005) explicitly refer to path
dependency, explaining that continuity can come from radical but
also minor changes. The historical development of technical flood
infrastructure and engineering solutions for flood defense, with
their high-cost investments, can make it difficult for policy makers
to withdraw from this dominant strategy. As a result of path
dependency it is generally difficult to change policies because
institutions are resistant to change and actors may protect the
existing model, even if  it is suboptimal (Greener 2002). In the
pattern of the general Streeck and Thelen framework, path
dependency provides explanatory factors created by the legacy of
flood defense, which may act to resist change.  
The third theoretical analytical approach that deals with change
focuses on the role of actors and coalitions: the advocacy coalition
framework (ACF; Sabatier and Weible 2007). This framework
suggests that certain advocacy coalitions (of politicians, civil
servants, scientists, journalists, CEOs, NGOs, etc.) group around
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a specific set of core beliefs where causations and values on the
topic (floods) and in policy (risk management) are shared. These
coalitions are formed because different policy relevant actors and
different interests are linked to them. Policy change can be
explained through the interactions between events in the external
environment of a policy domain, for instance, economic crises,
and the full translation of new ideas within the coalitions
(developing new forms of FRM strategies. The inclusion of this
final approach is considered to be important because the role of
actor coalitions was found to be significant during the different
case study analysis.  
Specifically, in the case of the flood defense strategy, we evaluate
first the result of transformation (discontinuity or continuity) by
preferentially analyzing the factors calling for a more radical
change and by observing whether those changes are present in all
or some of the dimensions of the PAA. Then, we assess the nature
of change (abrupt or incremental). The Streeck and Thelen
double-entry framework allows us, in a first step, to consider if
the position of the defense strategy is continuous or
discontinuous, and then to assess the nature of change occurring
in flood defense strategy. We address the question of how these
changes can be described and if  they lead to a continuous or
discontinuous situation. The central proposition of this
qualitative assessment is that the result of change should affect
most, if  not all, the four dimensions of the PAA. In a second step,
we consider the explanatory factors that lie behind these dynamics
of change, and analyze how these changes can be explained.
DYNAMICS REGARDING THE FLOOD DEFENSE
STRATEGY IN SIX EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Changes within the actor dimension
Flood defense is principally in the hands of governmental actors
at the national or local level. In all of the countries studied, the
national ministries and agencies belonging to the domains of the
environment and/or public works are heavily involved in flood
defense by setting rules and providing guidance regarding, e.g.,
dam safety. However, how flood defense is implemented in
practice differs across the countries: from the domination of the
national level in Poland and France, to responsibilities spread over
a number of organizations in a layered structure in the
Netherlands, Belgium, and England. In the Netherlands this is
combined with a strong sector-based governance, e.g., a specific
governmental layer for water management. Sweden is the only
country in which flood defense measures are primarily managed
and financed at the local level, e.g., municipalities, firms,
individuals, or combinations thereof, depending upon to whom
the land belongs and who needs to be protected.
From centralized to decentralized governance
Decentralization is a general trend in governance in Europe, and
it is also observable in the management of flood defense.
Particularly in England, responsibility for flood defense
implementation are redistributed to include local governments.
To a certain extent, in France, there is a transfer of responsibility.
National-level authorities can delegate the management of
defense infrastructures (especially minor fluvial dikes) when they
are not highly prioritized in the national defense strategy. The
decentralization trend is, however, less observable in Sweden,
Belgium, and Poland. In Sweden, the responsibility of providing
flood defense was already in the hands of municipalities at the
very beginning of our study period. In Poland, flood defense
responsibilities continue to be based at the national level. Belgium
forms a somewhat specific case, given that it has undergone an
intensive federalization process in the period of analysis. Flood
defense responsibilities have been transferred from the national
level to the regional level, but this transfer recentralized
responsibilities at the regional level (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels
Capital).
Increased public participation
Flood defense is traditionally based on technocratic decision-
making processes, and although this assertion still holds true
today, a broadening of the actors in decision making can be
observed. In each country, examples can be found of flood defense
planning that include nongovernmental actors in decision
making, e.g., the involvement of a nature conservation NGO in
the development of the Sigma Plan in Belgium, cooperation with
the World Wide Fund for flood risk mapping in Poland, and many
examples in England where the involvement of nongovernmental
actors is now the norm. With the exception of England, in most
countries, this engagement mainly involves organized stakeholder
groups without intensive forms of citizen participation.
From agricultural to environmental interest groups
Over the past 30 years, societal needs and activities have changed
considerably, impacting the governance structure of flood
defense. In most countries in our research, flood management has
long been driven by agricultural interests, except in France, where
flood defense has been implemented to ensure urban
development. In England, flood defense in certain areas has also
been performed by regional internal drainage boards whose major
focus lies in the optimization of land for agricultural purposes.
Similarly, in Belgium, the water management of non-navigable
watercourses was in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture
(Crabbé 2008). Socioeconomic developments and the
sustainability discourse led to a decrease in agricultural interests
and an increase in environmental concerns. Consequently,
reforms to the water management structure shifted the
responsibilities in most countries under study toward
environmental departments or were integrated under larger
umbrella groupings (spatial development, infrastructure, and
environment).
Changes within the rules dimension
Two changes can be observed in the transformation of the
decision-making processes within the six countries concerning the
formal and informal rules that guide the defense strategy, i.e., an
evolution toward a more multirule system and the diffusion of
responsibilities.
Toward a multirule approach
The evolution shows a shift from a legal requirement for defense
infrastructures, essentially from the state and based on safety
standards, to a broadening of legal requirements, i.e., the
environment, preparation, or urban planning, stemming from
different public authorities (multisector). The introduction of a
risk-based approach in FRM leads to increased attention to
spatial planning, preparedness planning, and emergency
management. As a result, flood risk responsibilities are partially
shared in different strategies and partially transferred to other
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government departments. In particular, this evolution occurs in
France and Belgium. In England, spatial planning and emergency
management have already been playing a larger role in FRM for
some time. In Sweden, where FRM is not a distinct policy area
in itself, flood prevention has recently been explicitly incorporated
in local legislation because, in Sweden, both spatial planning and
flood preparation are primarily a concern for the local level. In
the Netherlands, flood risk responsibilities remain primarily with
the water sector, which is similar than in Poland.  
The multiplication of the above requirements leads to an unclear
situation, especially with regard to the safety standards for flood
defense measures and also with the emergence of the concept of
integrated systemic flood policy. Ambitious national safety
standards for defense infrastructures are legally prescribed in the
Netherlands and Poland. In the other countries, the defense
infrastructure authority or the water managers determine the
most appropriate protection level. In France, the rules on legal
safety standards can change, depending on the local authorities
in charge of the defense structures, and in Sweden, the local rules
may define the requirements necessary to obtain a permit for
water operations, which includes flood defense.  
Furthermore, we observed a change in rules because of the
emergence of a more systemic approach to water management
and an increasing role of more diverse risk-based approaches
relating to floods that lead to integration of strategies. In England,
a holistic approach has been taken, while in Flanders (Belgium)
and the Netherlands a multilayered safety approach has been
adopted, although this remains at the pilot stage. To date, England
is the only country to have legally integrated such diversified
policies.
Diffusion of responsibilities
The broadening of the policy domains and the range of actors
involved leads to a redistribution of the responsibilities
concerning who is responsible for providing protection. Flood
protection in the Netherlands and Poland remains a statutory
duty of the state. The decentralization process in England shifts
responsibilities to lower government levels such as Lead Local
Flood Authorities, although (arguably) power continues to be
centralized and authorities remain dependent on Local
Government Finance Arrangements and must adhere to national
FRM policy and project appraisal (Penning-Rowsell and Johnson
2015). In Belgium and France, clear responsibilities remain
undefined, as though in a liminal position between the central
and the local authorities. In Sweden, municipalities have
responsibilities to ensure that citizens are safe.  
Flood risk responsibilities are also increasingly shifting toward
actors outside the government, i.e., the insurance sector and the
citizens. A special change with regard to citizens’ legal
responsibility is occurring. In the past decade, in most countries,
governmental actors have taken actions to make citizens
responsible. This process involves both soft (awareness
campaigns, etc.) and hard rules (legislation). In France, for
example, the revised Act on Civil Security of 2004 states that
citizens are responsible for their own safety. The authorities in
England and Sweden mainly have permissive powers to provide
flood defense, whereas citizens bear responsibility for their own
safety.
Changes in the distribution of resources
Toward new allocation strategies for flood defense investments
Both investments in and the maintenance of flood defense
infrastructure, place a large financial burden on FRM. However,
flood events often tempt policy makers to claim that security has
no price. This claim is especially observable in the Netherlands,
where the Delta Program is investing 1 billion Euro a year mainly
in flood defense measures such as dike enhancements. In other
countries, however, investments in flood defense appear highly
sensitive to the economic situation and other external factors. In
England, the FRM budget, which had been on the rise since 2004,
faced significant cuts following the elections of 2010 as a response
to the global financial crisis (Bubeck et al. 2013). Between 2015
and 2021, the government plans to invest £2.3 billion in more than
1500 projects to reduce the risks of flooding or coastal erosion
across England to more than 300,000 households (Defra 2016).
However, there has been criticism of the government being
reactive rather than proactive following recent flood events and
a report by the House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee (2016) is sceptical that the Government will reach
these targets. In turn, in Sweden, budgets for flood defense have
decreased in recent years.  
Consequently, we observe a change in the distribution of funding.
In Poland and France, resources for flood defense remain fully
funded by governmental levels. Since 2012, the defense
infrastructure in England has been partly financed through
partnership funding, whereby local authorities, businesses, and
other nongovernmental actors at the local level cofinance
investments. Flood defense in Sweden is financed by the
municipality, the local property owner, or combinations of both.  
An important issue in the allocation of flood defense spending is
how to decide which areas are most worth investing in. These
decisions are partly based on the ability of local actors to lobby
for defense structures. In England, investments are, in part, based
on the local capacity for partnership funding. A growing number
of countries now pay increased attention to the use of cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) to support investment decisions. Although CBA
is already a common practice in England, it is now also emerging
in the Netherlands, the Flemish region of Belgium, and Sweden.
In the Netherlands, CBA sometimes has broadened the scope for
flood defense measures, e.g., with side channels and dike
relocations as at the time of Room for the River, but mostly CBA
ends up supporting well-known measures such as dike
enforcement. Interestingly, and in contrast, in Flanders
(Belgium), the use of CBA is a catalyst in introducing a new
approach in flood defense: no longer are large infrastructural
works the norm; instead, a combination of local, small-scale
defense construction and mitigation measures are being adopted.
New sources of expertise
Overall, in the six selected countries, flood defense is characterized
as a highly technocratic strategy, primarily based on expert
decision making and technical solutions. For example, knowledge
of flood defense in the Netherlands is highly centralized because
of the coordination and support from the national government.
However, in recent decades, and in most countries selected, the
expertise underpinning the flood defense strategy has also
originated from different sources. Many national water managers
now host internal knowledge institutions and are also supported
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by a number of external partners, such as universities, consultancy
firms, and civil society actors. Most water managers have
undergone a shift in their staff  composition; whereas they were
previously bastions of hydro-technical engineers, new disciplines
find their way into risk management, e.g., bioengineers, IT
experts, biologists, public administration scholars, or social
scientists.
“Defense is not the only solution”: a new discourse?
As the fourth dimension of the PAA, the change in discourse is
mainly related to a common trend toward a more encompassing
management of flood risk that includes the consideration of
socially and environmentally sustainable solutions, such as
nature-based protection measures (Defra and Environmental
Agency 2014).  
Despite the rise of the risk-based approach and calls for
prevention, mitigation, and preparation measures in the
discourse, in practice, flood defense in most countries remains the
cornerstone of FRM among the actor, rules, and power
dimensions. Whether it is a statutory duty, citizens and public
actors expect the government to protect them from flooding
through structural protection measures, i.e., infrastructure.
However, in the discourse and in all of the countries, it is clear
that flood defense has changed in nature; the strategy is now (to
greater or lesser degrees) increasingly embedded within a
multisectoral flood risk management policy. Whereas in the past
flood defense was focused on a limited set of technical measures
and engineering options, today the actors in charge have
connections to policy fields relating to prevention, mitigation,
and preparation. Examples include the use of local diking
structures accompanied by flood retention zones and building
restrictions in less inhabited areas.
An overview of the four dimensions of the PAA on flood defense
policy changes
Between 1980 and 2015, flood defense developed from a strategy
that was based on a limited set of governmental actors,
infrastructural measures, technocratic expertise, and investment
strategies to the cornerstone of an integrated framework for
FRM. It now shares responsibilities with other actors; adopts
alternative solutions; and diversifies the requirements of the
legislative framework and partnerships for funding. Interestingly,
this evolution is observed in all of the different countries under
study, although the process and the result of change differ
significantly among them (Table 3).  
In reference to Streeck and Thelen’s typology, we generally assess
the changes observed with the help of the four dimensions (in
brief: actors, rules, resources, and discourses). The changes in the
actor dimension are external. Decentralization and public
participation are generalized in Europe, crossing many different
public policies in the fields of ecology and environment. The
change in the interests taken into account within the strategy, from
agricultural to environmental actor coalitions, refers to a more
internal change. In comparing the countries, even when we
observe a discontinuous situation in Belgium and The
Netherlands, the result of changes that are occurring maintain
continuity with the previous situation in most cases.  
The processes of change observed in the rules dimension of the
flood defense strategy are also characterized as incremental and
the general result of change shows a mostly continuous situation.
In the Netherlands and Poland, there are marginal changes, e.g.,
further integrating water legislation, but no substantial changes
in the nature or role of those rules. In both Belgium and France,
first, a transfer from the national authority to other government
departments has occurred, potentially using multiple and
different legal sources. Second, there is a diffusion of
responsibilities toward local authorities and citizens. However, to
date, the transfer of legal responsibility has not seemed to lead to
radical changes in the legal framework. In Sweden and England,
the multiple-rules approach, which integrates and connects to
different policy domains at various levels of governance (in
Sweden, essentially local authorities), has existed throughout the
time period studied.  
The changes observed in the resources dimension also occur in a
continuous mode, but a shift to decentralized levels is important
almost everywhere. In Sweden and England, we observe a
decrease in financial resources. In all of the countries, we observe
at least a need for the introduction of new financial resources
coming from local authorities, businesses, or nongovernmental
actors. The implication is that, consequently, in Belgium and
Sweden, new expertise on flood defense has for some time been
fragmented over different governmental institutions. However,
the flood defense strategy is more puzzling. Flood defense remains
highly based on closed and expert-led decision making, where the
introduction of new expertise does not imply a discontinuity in
the defense policy trend, England being an exception here.  
In most countries, we witnessed new discourses on flood risk
management, but this does not always affect the core of flood
defense strategy. Thus, the result of changes in discourses can be
characterized as discontinuous, slightly in the case of Poland and
heavily in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, where a more
integrative discourse on defense strategy is a new and strong
phenomenon. In Sweden and England, the discourses on
alternatives and changes from a predominant strategy on defense
have been in existence for a long period of time and do not appear
as a change. All in all, even when we observe all the processes of
changes in the six countries, the result of change is more
continuous than discontinuous.
EXPLAINING CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY: AN
INCREMENTAL AND PATH DEPENDENT CHANGE IN
NATURE
We analyze the nature of change presented above through the lens
of institutional theories and to analyze whether they are a change
“in nature,” i.e., real changes that have major and substantial
effects in the policy dimensions. We refer to Streeck and Thelen’s
(2005) definition of an “abrupt change” as a complete and rapid
change.  
The combination of the general model with the two specific
approaches stemming from institutional theories gives us a way
to interpret the dynamics in flood defense that have emerged from
the empirical material as presented above. Thanks to the
conceptual insights and the analytical study from the authors of
the path dependency literature, we observe two types of policy
lock-in effects in the flood defense strategy: increasing returns
effects, which are related to the financial crisis, and the stickiness
of the institutional pattern, which is related to issues pertaining
to the environment and climate change. From the ACF, we then
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Table 3. Main outcomes from the dynamics of change for each country.
 
Type of change:
continuity or
discontinuity?
Actors Rules Resources Discourses Result of
change
Belgium Discontinuity: Integration
of new actors
Discontinuity: Integration
of several rules
(environment, climate
change, safety, etc.) /
Transfer of ownership to
local authorities
Continuity:
Regional financial resources
/ Stability in financial
resources / Entry of
multiexpertise
Discontinuity:
Toward an integrative
multilayered strategy
Discontinuous
situation
England Continuity:
Existing presence of
multilayered strategy and
integration of new actors
Continuity:
Existing presence of
multiple rules
(environment, climate
change, safety, etc.)
Continuity:
Decrease in financial
resources /
Multipartnership financial
resources / Existing
presence of multiexpertise
Continuity:
Existing presence of
integrative defense strategy
Stable
situation
France Continuity: Predominance
of national powers
Discontinuity:
Transfer of ownership to
local authorities
Continuity:
National financial resources
/ Stability in financial
resources / Entry of
multiexpertise
Continuity:
Predominance of beliefs in
protection even with the
introduction of an
integrative perspective
Stable
situation
Netherlands Discontinuity:
Integration of new actors
Continuity:
Regional and national rules
Continuity:
National financial resources
/ Stability in financial
resources / National
expertise
Continuity:
Toward an integrative
multilayered strategy
Stable
situation
Poland Continuity:
Predominance of national
powers
Continuity:
National rules
Continuity:
National financial resources
/ Stability in financial
resources / National
expertise
Continuity:
Predominance of beliefs in
protection even with the
introduction of an
integrative perspective
Stable
situation
Sweden Continuity:
Existing presence of a local
actor system
Continuity:
National rules
Continuity:
Decrease in financial
resources / Local financial
resources / Existing
presence of multiexpertise
Continuity:
No real discourse on the
purpose of defense
Stable
situation
learn how to explain the role of the core beliefs of the public
administration coalition to elucidate the stability related to
societal demand.
The increasing returns effects influencing the stability of the
financial crisis context
For most of the countries, the availability of funding remains
important in flood defense. As expected from the power of
increasing returns (North 1990), we found that, despite the
financial crisis, countries continue to spend money on flood
defense. However, we can observe a trend of seeking alternative
and less expensive nonstructural measures in a few countries
(Flanders-Belgium and England). In general, there is strong
continuity in development. For instance, in France, although the
local Program for Action for Flood Prevention is meant to include
different flood management strategies, defense infrastructures
still account for more than half  of the budget. Furthermore, in
the countries that have most recently joined the European Union
(EU), such as Poland in 2004, when there has not been sufficient
investment from national governments, the EU has provided
additional funds to the flood defense sector. In Poland, the
problem focuses on the most sensible and effective manner in
which the funds should be used. Unfortunately, as an effect of
prolonged investments and procedures associated with the
division of central or EU funds, money must be spent in a short
period of time to be eligible for the next tranche of funding. This
situation does not help in making innovative decisions in flood
management. Additionally, it leads to the further entrenchment
of well-known strategies, such as defense, and provides less
opportunity to experience emerging strategies, such as mitigation.
In other cases, however, EU investments have had the opposite
effect. For instance, in Belgium and England, EU LIFE-projects
have allowed innovative approaches that combine FRM and
nature conservation.  
In short, reductions in investments and the focus of funding still
available for defense infrastructure can, in some countries,
partially contribute to the mechanisms of path dependency. Past
investments in infrastructures (dikes, levees, etc.) currently imply
continuous investments at least to maintain their efficacy in the
Netherlands. With the exception of England and Belgium, the
limited degree of radical change within the flood defense strategy
can be explained by reductions in investments, the concentration
of resources in well-known solutions to address the short-term
requirements of funders, and the strong coalitions of public
authorities or technocratic expert-based knowledge. These create
an increasing returns effect that, to date, does not allow a change
in the nature of flood defense.
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The stickiness of institutional design minimizing the
environmental challenge and climate change issues
Pierson (1993, 2000) suggests that, once policies have been
designed, they are change-resistant. Their designers have often
built them on a pattern of “no alternative,” particularly to avoid
changes from their successors. Institutions are designed not only
to be difficult to reverse in the future but also unattractive to
reform. Changes in institutional patterns are very costly both for
individuals and within the institutions themselves. We can observe
a strong policy lock-in effect within the defense strategy, even if
in each country the environmental discourse is increasingly
influenced by concerns related to the hydrological impact of
climate change and calls for an adaptation of defense strategy.  
In Europe, it is clear that the geographical and meteorological
context is changing and, consequently, the physical drivers of
flooding are both reinforcing the calls for diversification of FRM
strategies. The role of flood as a shock event is a factor of change.
For instance, in Sweden, the national commission on risk and
vulnerabilities with regard to climate change, finalized in 2007,
contributed to placing the expected consequences of climate
change, such as increased flood risks, on the agenda. Although
past flood events assist in leading to changes in the flood risk
policy, by acting as internal shocks, more often they are facilitating
events, or “windows of opportunity” (Kingdon 1995), that enable
the policy to be changed rather than act as an absolute driver for
change. In the case studies, the increase of hydrological events
does not result in a radical turn of FRM, but gradually transforms
it toward fewer structural protection measures and toward a more
integrative nonstructural strategy.  
There is a spirit of change toward a more system-based approach
because of the growing importance of sustainability,
environmental values, and the possibilities of creating solutions
by working with nature (Defra 2014, Wilkinson et al. 2014). In
England, the Making Space for Water policy (2004) aimed to
develop such a comprehensive, integrated, and forward-thinking
strategy for managing future flood risk and integrating these
activities into an overall approach to managing flooding more
generally. The same tendency exists in the Netherlands with the
Room for the River policy. Even if  awareness of climate change
and the value of environmentally friendly approaches are
increasing as a response to the consequences of flooding, the
engineered infrastructure of protection remains a dominant
response. In The Netherlands, the strong tendency toward nature-
friendly measures and room for the river projects has, over the
last few years, died down again and recent governmental priorities
are back to “safety first.” In general, we observe a strong path
dependency in the choices of flood management for the
traditional defense strategy. The gap between the national
institutional discourses, through expertise or influential reports,
and local implementation in terms of distribution of resources
and rules, explains that even if  the process of change seems
radical, the result of change is mostly continuous. For instance,
in England, an influential Institution of Civil Engineers report
(2001) suggested that the country should no longer continue to
rely solely on flood defense and that natural processes could be
better used to manage flood risk. The report reinforced the
continued move toward the desire for a more sustainable flood
risk management that can only be achieved by better working
with the natural system. It represented an acceptance of the fact
that floods cannot be prevented and that communities at flood
risk must learn to live with flooding. Nevertheless, in the English
Hull case study, where past flood events include the 1953 and 2007
floods, the physical setting has been a key factor in shaping the
approach to land drainage and hard-engineered defenses, without
which development in the area would not have been possible. In
many cases, the argument of the local reality in terms of the need
for development, specific geographical patterns, increased
awareness of risk among local stakeholders could not influence
the change toward a system-based approach.  
The stickiness of flood defense is explained by the levee effect
(Burby 2000) or the escalator effect (Parker 1995). Investments in
defense infrastructure stimulate human spatial development in
flood-prone zones, which in turn forces water managers to
continuously invest in the maintenance and further development
of this defense infrastructure (White 1945, Bubeck et al. 2013).
This levee effect also appears as a significant explanatory factor
in the case studies investigated in this research.
The core beliefs of the technocratic expertise coalition
The advocacy coalition framework explains that actors involved
in policy gather in coalitions joined by specific normative and
scientific core beliefs and policy beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993) that want to influence the political and policy order.
In general, flood defense doctrine and strategy depend entirely
on state administrations or agencies. It is a highly expert-based
strategy and government-driven policy. The core beliefs are
especially strong because, as fundamental reasons to be
committed to in policy, they are very unlikely to change (Sabatier
and Weible 2007, Sabatier 2014). The flood defense strategy is
traditionally framed by public administration, and especially by
the national level. Except in the cases of Sweden (the importance
of the local administration) and England (the multiactor system),
in each of the countries under study, the national administration
is predominant in expertise. Traditional actors in flood defense
share a common core belief  system with regard to the importance
of technocratic expertise. This helps to explain the stickiness of
the technocentric policy regime and indicates why this is a small
transition in power. Even when the spectrum of actors is
increasing, there remains not only a lack of integration of the
external needs from other government departments, e.g., spatial
planning or emergency response, but also a lack of civil society
involvement in many countries.  
The actor coalition organized around a focus on technocratic
expertise gives little room for a window of integration for
nongovernmental actors such as NGOs or private companies,
public consultation, and participation in decision-making
processes in flood defense. We interpret this limit of integration
as an explanation of the resistance to change. For example, flood
defense investments in Poland sometimes involve public
participation procedures, but more often, they result in
controversies and protests. The protests advocate NIMBY (Not
In My Backyard) sentiments, and projects disregard peoples’
interests because of the tradition that decisions should be
undertaken by experts. Environmental NGOs attempt to fill this
gap in public participation; however, they are perceived by the
state administration and services as brakes on all action. In those
countries where there is little openness in the decision-making
process, the dominant position of the defense strategy is robust
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and explains the resistance to change. Countries where there is
more openness of the political system and less dominance of flood
defense show interesting examples of public participation, and
illustrations of more radical changes. For example, in the northern
England town of Pickering a project to address local flood risk
involved the formation of local focus (competency) groups. The
project demonstrated enhanced stakeholder participation
through introducing the concept of collaborative coproduction
of knowledge (Lane et al. 2011). In 2007 the coproduction of
knowledge model was practically tested in the town, the output
of which was so successful that it resulted in implementation of
viable local solutions to flooding (Whatmore and Landström
2011).
CONCLUSION
Changes in risk perceptions, hydrological impacts from climate
change, growing urban expansion, and participation challenges
have increasingly put pressure on the traditional flood defense
strategy. This paper explores and compares the changes the flood
defense strategy has undergone in six European countries. We ask
whether the strategy is shifting toward a discontinuous situation
or not, and whether the process of change is in nature more
incremental or radical.  
In each country, the defense strategy is an outcome of governance
arrangements, which are characterized by a specific set of
ingredients that consist of actors, power and resources, rules, and
discourses. These arrangements are challenged by a number of
developments: administrative decentralization, financial constraints,
the democratic deficit, and environmental, developmental, and
spatial challenges. This dynamic influences the defense strategy,
which, in all countries, is somehow becoming much broader and
more open, creating more room for local, private, and individual
responsibilities (as opposed to concentrating power and resources
in technocratic state hands) and promoting a discourse of more
diverse modes of protection.  
However, we indicate that changes within the flood defense
strategy are very heterogeneous among and within countries.
Some of the countries observed have in the last 30–35 years clearly
been moving toward a path of change in terms of actors, rules,
discourses, and resources (Belgium or England), whereas others
are shifting in one or two of these dimensions only (Sweden, the
Netherlands, France, Poland). In all countries, the change taking
place in the flood defense strategy has not led to a discontinuity
in FRM but has occurred incrementally. Defense measures remain
a founding principle of FRM in every country and the first
method of protecting populations and human activities. With the
exception of England, which has for a long time diversified FRM,
the defense strategy remains dominant. However, it is
complemented by other measures to provide a more efficient and
effective policy, e.g., spatial planning measures and disaster
management. Hence, we can conclude that the rise of the FRM
discourse has not led to a replacement of flood defense as a
dominant strategy. Rather, it has shifted its position from a solo
strategy to a central strategy within the FRM framework.  
The stickiness of the flood defense strategy can be explained by
factors of path dependency. This path dependency can be found
both in the actors, rules, and resources dimensions. Strongly
established actor coalitions, a solid institutional design centered
around flood defense, and sunk costs of flood defense investments
made in the past, hamper a radical shift toward new flood risk
strategies.  
In conclusion, we assert that the classical role of flood defense
remains dominant at a general level; at the least, it is a cornerstone
in flood management. However, the position of flood defense is
very gradually shifting. Changes can be defined as part of an
adaptive strategy of “resilience as resistance” rather than as a real
change in nature toward diversified flood risk management, given
that it is often promoted in a broader understanding of resilience
and integrated flood management.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
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